726
635
634
648
669

[For historical information on the region of Manz in Shoa Province, along with its succession of leaders, its warfare with the Galla, and internal strife, see category 175.]

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

I am the descendant of Nagāssi, and who put you, a Galla, on the throne of my fathers?"[81] He began his campaign by sending an expedition against the Wallo Galla, who were dependents of Rās Gugsa. But before he was able to persuade the reluctant Shoan nobility to venture forth against Gondar, Wassan Sagad's ambitions were cut short, in the fifth year of his reign, by the dagger of a slave.

The assassination of Wassan Sagad brought Shoa a moment of anarchy. In the absence of central authority, vicious passions were unleashed—"at Debra Libanos alone there fell no fewer than eight hundred victims to private animosity, of whose murder no account was ever taken."[82] The Galla burned hamlets over a wide area; they captured the heir apparent and prevented him from reaching the Shoan capital, then at Qundi. At this point Sāhla Selassie, younger son of the late *rās*, left the seclusion of his studies and presented himself to the Shoan nobility. His daring and quick wit won their consent. They named him Rās of Shoa at eighteen years, and he soon began to style himself as king (*negus*) of Shoa as well.

In the ensuing decades Sāhla Selassie completed the process of conquering and consolidating Shoa that his father had initiated. His rule was strong and beneficent, though tribes which did not pay tribute were shown no mercy. He led forays into Galla country three times a year, during which delinquent or independent settlements suffered sudden and total devastation.

A major crisis during the reign of Sāhla Selassie was the rebellion of one of his commanders, a man named Matako. Matako had risen to high position from that of minor retainer by dint of his fighting ability, but he antagonized the king by requesting that the king's daughter be married to his son. This was a double breach of etiquette, for the king's daughter would normally be given only to someone from a high-ranking family, and in any case the request should be tendered by some mediating elders, not in person. In the wake of the tension that ensued, Sāhla Selassie had Matako imprisoned. Matako escaped, however, and raised an army of Galla tribesmen to fight his campaign for revenge. The royal forces were in serious trouble. Sāhla Selassie sent a desperate message to the people of Manz: "My brothers, my relations, come and help me!"[83]

Such help could not be taken for granted. The men of Manz were then, as ever, fiercely independent, unwilling to subordinate themselves to distant authorities. At the time of Sāhla Selassie, in fact, Krapf observed that

> [His Majesty's] power and influence in that part of his dominions is very limited and loose. The Mansians openly declare, "We know little about Sahela Selassieh." Nobody would venture to say so in Efat.[84]

Still, the Shoan line had been infused with new Manzē blood by the marriage of Sāhla Selassie's father to Zanaba Warq, the grand-daughter of Golē,

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

to the rebel leaders' appeal for a show of public support, hundreds of students staged a demonstration on behalf of the coup. Except for occasional school strikes in the past, this was the first time that Ethiopian students had ever taken part in any sort of organized political process. The novelty of the experience was reflected in the confusion on many faces as they marched through the streets of the capital, chanting a militant refrain and carrying placards that celebrated "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" and "Our Country's Peaceful Change." For some, the experience was quite unreal; it was as though they were behaving thus because that is how one is supposed to behave at a time of revolution. Not a few of the participants actually regretted the coup but went along because, as one put it: "The coup has taken place; my friends are for it; so what is one to do?"

Even so, there was a moment of genuine political engagement for all when the student demonstrators proceeded to the army headquarters with the vain plea to forestall civil violence and join the new regime installed by the Imperial Bodyguard. Though they were turned away by bayonets, that moment gave the students the intoxicating taste of direct political expression. Subsequently, the army's abrupt suppression of the rebels left these students in an awkward position. All who took part in the demonstration were required to write letters of apology to the Emperor as a condition of being readmitted to study. They did so, and returned to school; but they have never been the same again. Though on the surface they appear to have reverted to the apolitical, passive orientation of the pre-coup days, occasional oratorical contests and poetry readings have given expression to a sharpened criticism of the government and greater restlessness in the student body.

Because of the relative absence of information and discussion pertaining to domestic political questions heretofore, Ethiopian students have tended to have slightly more knowledge and interest regarding international politics. On the general question of war and peace they seem to be influenced by the high value given to warfare in traditional Ethiopia. As many as forty per cent of all the students consider war "sometimes a good thing." This sentiment is somewhat stronger among the secondary school students than among the college students, but even the latter show a higher percentage of choice for this response than any of the national groups in the Gillespie-Allport study—except perhaps Egypt. (See Table 12.)

In their attitudes toward the "big three" world powers, the Ethiopian students seem to be most favorably disposed toward the United States, secondly toward the Soviet Union, and thirdly toward Great Britain. (See Table 13.) The United States is liked because it "helps other countries," has a high standard of living, and is "advanced in civilization"; while it is disliked because of its color discrimination and its being "aggressive," "rude," "boast-

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

ical wit and activism displayed by students from other countries has embarrassed their cautious dispositions.

There are three reasons for this relative lack of politicization of the Ethiopian students. One is that, having maintained her ancient independence throughout the "scramble for Africa," Ethiopia entered the twentieth century as an independent nation; and five years of Italian rule were not sufficient to shake her spirit. Ethiopian students have thus not had to participate in the anti-imperialist movement, the great school for political activism in the colonial areas.

A second factor is the deeply rooted habit of total subordination to any legitimate authority. Because of this orientation there is a persisting disposition to relegate concern for all political questions to the highest authorities. Nearly two-thirds of the secondary students and a third of the college students maintain that one should always obey the order of a superior, arguing that "obedience is a virtue," "things would not go right otherwise," and "the Bible says so."

The third reason for the almost apolitical posture of Ethiopian students has been the absence of opportunities for political expression in their country. African students from British colonies have in the past been surprised to find that their colonial situation admitted far more freedom of speech and press than Ethiopia. Teachers are expected to keep anything remotely connected with Ethiopian politics out of the classroom, and the editors are expected to keep them out of the newspapers. Nor have the students been permitted to form any kind of politically relevant associations. Even casual discussion of domestic political problems among friends has been curtailed because of the all-pervading fear of government informers.

All this has not prevented Ethiopian students from being affected to a moderate degree by the libertarian and egalitarian ideals of the West. The teaching of European history in secondary school, evaluation of students' performance without respect to class or tribal affiliation, and the exercise of electing student officers in the colleges have acted to leaven the political imagination of the students. Many of them thus ventured a degree of political criticism in their anonymous questionnaires. Forty-three per cent indicated disapproval of the existing differences between "big men" and the common people. Thirty-nine per cent were critical of the degree of control exerted by the government, of which group two-thirds felt that governmental controls are too strict (e.g., not permitting free expression), and one-third felt they were not strict enough (e.g., with respect to corruption and provincial administration).

The abortive coup d'état of December, 1960, jarred the Addis Ababa college students into an unprecedented state of political activity.[37] In response

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

authorities. Except for a very few eccentric individuals who have seemed oblivious to the dangers of speaking out their criticism of the status quo in public, this has in the nature of current circumstances necessarily involved clandestine activity. Returnees have been involved in small conspiratorial groups since the mid-fifties. The December, 1960, coup d'état has been the most ambitious rebellious project to be acted out so far. Similarly motivated activities have included the duplication and distribution of subversive literature, and the formation of small groups as groundwork for an eventual political party.

Our data do not permit reliable estimates of the frequency of these different modes of adaptation among the returnees. It is important to note, however, that individuals often change from one mode to another in the course of their experience after return and that many follow more than one pattern at the same time. It is unlikely that the total number of returnees oriented primarily as rebels has ever exceeded two per cent. Most of them move in and out of phases of Reformism, Withdrawal, and Opportunism, depending to a large extent on the accidents of their appointments. A more concrete picture of their experience may be suggested by the following case study, that of a Western-educated Ethiopian who went from a phase of Withdrawal to one of Reformism tinged with Opportunism.

The Adjustment of "Haile": Case Study of a Returnee

October, 1958. Haile has recently returned from four years of study in a Western country. He speaks very critically about the state of things in Ethiopia. He is particularly upset by the prevailing inefficiency, the lack of industriousness, and the interminable procrastination (*Ishi sega*).

January, 1959. Haile seems deeply depressed. The ministry in which he has been placed affords him no opportunity to work effectively and the job he has bears no relation to what he was trained for. He has withdrawn more into himself, but to all outward appearances plays perfectly well, with great self-assurance, the role of the Amhara bureaucrat.

July, 1959. Now Haile is working in a different ministry, in a job somewhat more closely related to his training. He appears to feel productive and useful now, and his criticism is constructive. For example, he frequently compares the situation in the United States and Ethiopia, to show how the same sort of problem can be solved more readily in the U.S. because of its greater facilities. Though Ethiopia's comparative handicaps frustrate him, he talks of plans for the development of Ethiopia with some enthusiasm. . . . Haile complains of an

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

But this gentle, paternal control has been backstopped by more rigorous sanctions. Censorship controls assure that anything that is published is highly flattering of the government. Intelligence networks keep intellectuals from speaking their minds and developing them through open exchange with others. Associations have in general not been permitted to form, or else have been saturated with government informers. Coupled with these repressive measures has been the policy of making appointments dependent on the extent to which one curries favor with the Emperor directly, or one of the new nobles who is high in favor at a given time. The intellectuals, no less than the new nobility, have been kept in line by *shum-shir* and *divide et impera*. "We have been kept from acting," said one remorseful returnee, "by fear and the sweetness of office."

In the political order sustained by the rule of Haile Selassie, the paramountcy of loyalty to the imperial government as a value has precluded the ascendance of values of national development and technical competence, values it is the peculiar burden of the intelligentsia to bear and assert. In this situation a vicious cycle of mutual mistrust has developed between the government and the intellectuals. Although the articulation of standards and the expression of criticism are important functions of intellectuals, the Emperor has tended to regard all expressions of criticism which reflect on the government, which is his personal government, as expressions of filial ingratitude at best, and at worst as signs of subversion. The intellectuals, in turn, have accepted this definition of the situation and have tended to assume—after some disheartening experiences in the course of the fifties—that is was not plausible for them to express criticism in a framework of basic loyalty to the regime. Distrust fed distrust, and antagonism mounted. The abortive coup d'état of December, 1960, was but the most outspoken and violent expression of this.

This growth of antagonism to the government has seeped down among the students. The feeling has become increasingly widespread among students at home and abroad that genuine service to the nation and the performance of technical functions are incompatible with a loyal and secure existence under the present regime. Thus, one student in a Western country said in 1961: "I am afraid to return to Ethiopia. I fear that I shall either lose all my principles, as so many of my friends seem to have done, or that I shall end up without a job or in prison."

ETHIOPIA'S DILEMMA

Haile Selassie has often proclaimed his devotion to a program of modernization. His personal achievements in this direction have been substantial: the establishment of much modern bureaucratic machinery, the institution of a parliament and electoral procedures, a mild degree of industrialization, and, above all, the provision of a modern secular education for thousands of young people.